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"You say… I hear…": Epistemic gaps in practitioner-parent/carer talk  
  Nick Hodge and Katherine Runswick-Cole 
Summary 
• Policy guidance has often focused on the need for strong partnerships 
between parents/carers and practitioners to support the learning of 
children labeled with Special Educational Needs and/or Disabilities; 
• Despite this policy focus, relationships between parents/carers and 
practitioners are often difficult 
• This chapter explores the nature of these difficulties drawing on the work 
of Lipsky (1971) and McKenzie and Scully(2007) 
• In conclusion, there are suggestions for how partnership working between 
parents/carers, practitioners and children might be developed. 
Abstract 
The past two decades have seen a focus in educational policy in England on the 
development of more effective practitioner-parent relationships (Department for 
Education and Skills (DfES), 2001, 2004). Yet parents continue to report feeling 
marginalised and excluded within these relationships (Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 
2008). Clearly, different ways of thinking about, understanding and engaging within 
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these relationships are required if practitioner-parent partnership is to become more 
than just policy rhetoric.  In this chapter we draw on the theoretical and philosophical 
concepts of 'epistemic gaps' (MacKenzie and Scully, 2007); shared biographical 
standpoints (Ashworth, 2016) and street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1971) to expose 
and to explore some of the problematic communications that arise between parents 
and practitioners in their talk in the context of the Special Educational Needs and 
Disability (SEND) system 
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The past two decades have seen a focus in educational policy in England on the 
development of more effective practitioner-parent relationships (Department for 
Education and Skills (DfES), 2001, 2004). Yet parents continue to report feeling 
marginalised and excluded within these relationships (Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 
2008). Clearly, different ways of thinking about, understanding and engaging within 
these relationships are required if practitioner-parent partnership is to become more 
than just policy rhetoric.  In this chapter we draw on the theoretical and philosophical 
concepts of 'epistemic gaps' (MacKenzie and Scully, 2007); shared biographical 
standpoints (Ashworth, 2016) and street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1971) to expose 
and to explore some of the problematic communications that arise between parents 
and practitioners in their talk in the context of the Special Educational Needs and 
Disability (SEND) system.  The focus of this paper is on partnership within Education 
and related services. Practitioner therefore refers to all those employed to offer 
educational and related health and care services to disabled children and young people 
and their families.  In brief, we propose that epistemic gaps arise when each of the 
parties in a communication exchange have significantly different life experiences 
from each other; they do not share the same biographical standpoint. We explore the 
nature and impact of these epistemic gaps on parents and their children in more detail 
below before then positioning them within the wider systemic context. We suggest 
that a discussion of how epistemic gaps emerge within practitioner-parent 
communication is timely given the changing policy context for SEND following the 
passage of the Children and Families Act 2014 (DfE, 2014) through the British 
Parliament. The Children and Families Act (2014) brought in fundamental changes to 
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provision for children and young people with SEND in England. Parts of the Act also 
apply to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Drawing on a discourse analysis 
approach, we examine practitioner-parent talk to reveal the gaps between the 
epistemic positions of practitioners and parents. We then identify some of the 
systemic barriers that create and maintain epistemic chasms. Our discussion 
concludes with a consideration of how MacKenzie’s and Scully’s (2007) concept of 
‘sympathetic moral imagination’ might be a useful tool for enabling more informed 
and shared understandings of biographical standpoints between practitioner and 
parent. Knowledge and appreciation of these different standpoints might then act as 
bridges over epistemic chasms that allow practitioner-parent partnerships to flourish. 
 
The Current Policy Context in England: Practitioner-Parent Partnership 
The new 'Special Educational Needs and Disability Code of Practice: 0 to 25 years' 
has been recently published (DfE 2014). . The SEND Code of Practice sets out the 
services that education and health services in England must provide for disabled 
children and those with special educational needs, 0-25 years, and their parents/carers.  
This code is a revision of the 'Code of Practice on the Identification and Assessment 
of Special Educational Needs' (DfES, 2001) and responds to a raft of changes in 
provision for children with SEND and their families set out in the Children and 
Families Act 2014 ( DfE, 2014). A key area of focus in the original 'Code of Practice' 
(DfES, 2001) was practitioner-parent partnership.  The new code (DfE,2014: 14) has 
taken up this theme and claims to offer 'a clearer focus on the participation of children 
and young people and parents in decision-making at individual and strategic levels'.  
It re-affirms that local authorities  must have regard to 'the views, wishes and feelings 
of the child or young person, and the child’s parents' (DfE; 2014: 19) and that they 
must support the participation of parents and children in decision-making (DfE, 
2014).  Local Authorities in England are the councils that provide services for local 
areas. 
Local authorities are required to support the child or young person and their parents to 
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achieve the best educational and other outcomes 'preparing [children] effectively for 
adulthood' (DfE, 2014: 19).  The Code is a re-iteration of the policy discourse 
advocating practitioner-parent partnership that has characterised special education 
policy in England over the last thirty years (DES, 1978).  Following the changes in 
the Children and Families Act 2014 (DfE, 2014) local authorities are now required to 
include 'fully' children with SEND and their parents in the process of developing 
Education, Health and Care Plans. Education, health and care plans detail the 
provision that a child or young person will receive across these three services. These 
set out the provision needed to support the child and replaced the previous system of 
statements of special educational needs. Furthermore, local authorities are required to 
consult parents on changes to provision for the child.  The Code describes parents’ 
views as 'important' (DfE, 2014: 21) and states that education providers should ensure 
that they 'give them [parents] confidence that their views and contributions are valued 
and will be acted upon' (DfE, 2014: 21).  However, this continued emphasis on the 
need for parents’ views to be taken seriously in the SEND process is balanced by a 
focus on the requirement to prioritise the views of the child. Indeed, in the Code, 
when a child reaches sixteen, there is a significant change in how parents are 
positioned, as the focus shifts to making the views of young people a priority: 
The Children and Families Act 2014 gives significant new rights directly 
to young people once they reach the end of compulsory school age (the 
end of the academic year in which they turn 16). When a young person 
reaches the end of compulsory school age, local authorities and other 
agencies should normally engage directly with the young person 
rather than their parent, ensuring that as part of the planning process 
they identify the relevant people who should be involved and how to 
involve them (DfE, 2014: 21) (our emphasis). 
 
While the Code maintains the view that families will continue to play a 'critical role' 
(DfE, 2014: 21) and recognises that '[m]ost young people will continue to want, or 
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need, their parents and other family members to remain involved in discussions and 
decisions about their future' (p.21), it remains unclear, as yet, how these changes will 
impact on practitioner-parent relationships. 
 
In our previous writing about practitioner-parent partnership we have acknowledged 
the tensions in practitioner-parent relationships including disagreements between 
parents and practitioners about what constitutes ‘knowledge’ about a child. Often 
practitioner knowledge of syndromes and impairment is privileged over a parent's 
expert knowledge of their child. Of course, tensions also occur in particular over the 
delivery of services and available budgets (Runswick-Cole, 2007; Hodge and 
Runswick-Cole, 2008). Parents and practitioners disagree about a host of things: 
diagnosis, intervention, support, and school placements to name but a few (Hodge, 
2005; Runswick-Cole, 2007; Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 2008). The day-to-day 
reality of practitioner-parent partnership fails to live up to the policy rhetoric.  The 
fact that a high number of parents continue to register appeals with the Special 
Educational Needs Tribunal (3,600 in 2012/13 (MoJ, 2013)) is evidence that conflict 
in the system remains.  This conflict was acknowledged by the Coalition Government 
(The Government in England and Wales that was in power at the time of the 
development and passing of the Children and Families Act 2014 and other related 
legislation) in England and Wales and the publication of 'Support and Aspiration: A 
New Approach to Special Educational Needs' (DfE, 2011) and the passage of the 
subsequent Children and Families Act (DfE, 2014) sought, in part, to address conflict 
within the system.  Edward Timpson, then Minister for Children, argued that the Act 
was intended to address what had become an entrenched and adversarial special 
educational needs system: 
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For too long, families who face big enough challenges already have also 
found themselves facing - as one mother put it - "an unending battle" 
with a system that’s supposed to be on their side' (Timpson, 2014, np).   
 
It can be seen therefore that, even though the nature and experience of practitioner-
parent partnership in Education has been widely researched and discussed by policy 
makers, practitioners and parents still struggle to work in partnership.  In the context 
of continued tensions and a changing policy landscape, practitioner-parent partnership 
remains an important area of inquiry for anyone interested in the lives of children, 
young people and families engaged in the special educational needs and disability 
system. New understandings of what enables or disables these relationships are vital 
to developing more positive ways of working for everyone. 
 
Epistemic positioning 
As authors of this chapter, we share an interest in and some of the same 
understandings of how disability impacts upon the lives of children 'with SEND’ and 
their families.  This is reflected in some of our previous joint research and 
publications (Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 2008; Runswick-Cole and Hodge 2009; 
Hodge and Runswick-Cole, 2013). We conceptualise special educational needs and 
disability premised on sociological understandings of disability that locate the 
‘problem’ of disability in society, not in the individual child or family (Mallett and 
Runswick-Cole, 2014).  Moreover, we share an ‘epistemic position’ (MacKenzie and 
Scully, 2007) as researchers who locate our work in the fields of critical disability 
studies and special educational needs. We both hope that by supporting greater 
understanding between practitioners and parents, we can contribute to more enabling 
practices in special education. However, despite our shared positions we have often 
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found that our different life experiences can often lead us to interpret the experiences 
of parents, children and young people and practitioners very differently. Within social 
theory, the term ‘biographical standpoint’ is used to capture how our own particular 
life experiences, including the cultural, social, political and personal, shape a unique 
understanding of the world (Ashworth, 2016). Education research has illustrated how 
in schools, 'issues of ethnicity, race and socio-economic class inform the shifting 
power play…' (Lumby, 2007: 221). As white middle class academics we will have 
shared some privileged experiences of engagement with schools that are likely to be 
very different from those from other biographies and experiences of social economic 
power. But even within our own shared position our individual characteristics and 
unique experiences means that we arrive at disability and schools from both shared 
and distinct epistemic positions.      
 It is from our biographical standpoint, therefore, that we then interpret all that 
happens to us. Different biographical standpoints lead to different understandings of 
situations and interpretations of social exchanges. So for the authors our different 
biographical standpoints cause at times an epistemic gap to open up between us.  
Intersubjectivity is the term that is used to conceptualise shared understandings of 
being in the world between distinct subjects (Crossley, 2005). The authors have a 
collective standpoint through our shared interest in disability and so respond similarly 
to some events.  However, our distinct biographies, detailed in brief below, contain 
our individual and unique lived experience of disability. These sometimes then lead 
us to interpret exchanges between parents and practitioners quite differently.  
Nick came to research as part of his practitioner development as a former teacher and 
as a lecturer. Katherine came to her research as a former early years teacher but also 
as the mother of a disabled child and she was simply "bloody furious" with a system 
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that was letting her and her son down.  These different positions and experiences 
mean that despite the many experiences and understandings we share, we often see 
things differently from one another. We are still sometimes surprised by each other’s 
reactions to and interpretations of experiences.  For example, Katherine shared a story 
with Nick of a parent who did not know any of the other parents at her son’s primary 
school. This resulted from teaching assistants (TAs) asking the mother to stand in a 
different place from everyone else at home time so that she could be there to take 
immediate responsibility for her son as soon he left the classroom.  Nick was amazed 
this could happen and while he exclaimed that: "you see, the teaching assistants just 
wouldn’t know that the mother felt like that", Katherine felt that the teaching 
assistants should have worked that out for themselves. Nick, however, wondered why 
the mother had not told them. Another example occurred recently, Nick remembered 
a mother telling him about a time when she had collected her son from his first day at 
secondary school. The young man started to show signs of agitation. "Oh" said the 
teacher to the mother, "he's been fine until now. He is just doing this because you are 
here". For the mother this was a devastating encounter. Already anxious about her son 
and how he had managed a new larger and busier school on his first day the mother 
reported that the teacher's comment then made her feel as though she herself was a 
source of tension for her own son. A devastating thought for a parent. The mother was 
distressed and perplexed as to why a teacher might make such a hurtful comment to a 
parent. On hearing this account Katherine agreed emphatically with the mother; the 
actions of the teacher made no sense to Katherine either. For Katherine the teacher 
should have known the effect that such a comment would have on a parent. Nick, on 
the other hand, when told of this encounter by the mother, had felt an immediate 
sympathy with the teacher. Nick's own experience as a teacher informed his 
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understanding of this encounter between the mother and the secondary school teacher. 
Nick remembered how worried he would sometimes feel as a teacher that a parent 
would think badly of his school if their child showed signs of distress when the parent 
came to collect their child. Nick may well have said these same words himself on 
occasion thinking that they would offer reassurance to the parent. Knowing how this 
mother reacted to the words however then helped Nick to see that his own words 
might not always have been received as positively as he had intended. This incident 
illustrates our different epistemic positions but more crucially it demonstrates how 
practitioner-parent relationships can develop from 'day one' into antagonistic polar 
lines of defense. 
Despite our shared roles as researchers, our positions as ‘practitioner’ and ‘parent’ 
mean that we can struggle to know what it means to have lived the life of the other. 
We want to identify and understand better where, how and why the gaps in 
understanding and communication occur between practitioners and parents when in 
theory they should be on the same side and working together in the best interests of 
the child.  We see this as essential because we know that children, young people, 
parents and practitioners can all fall down these gaps with damaging and sometimes 
devastating consequences for those involved (Runswick-Cole, 2007). 
 
We decided to explore these gaps through a focus on parent-practitioner talk. In doing 
so we sought to explore what these micro level interactions could reveal about the 
macro nature of parent-practitioner relationships within the current policy context. We 
also wondered what some of the wider messages that society gives out about SEND 
might be revealed in such talk. In focusing on talk, we draw on a long tradition of 
discourse analysis (Parker, 2002). Discourse analysis pays attention to what language, 
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or discourse, does.  Discourse analysts argue that language does not merely describe 
what is there: it also constructs it. The ways that things or people are described 
impacts on how people perceive and think about them. In the context of the SEND 
system, we take the phrase ‘the special needs’ to illustrate the point (Runswick-Cole 
and Hodge, 2009). Gale (2000) quotes a parent who within a research project in 
Australia spoke of the experiences of her daughter whose personhood was taken from 
her the moment that she was categorised as 'a 6', the highest level of disability on the 
Australian school assessment scale: '"If your child is a 6 the teachers go into the next 
room and say "Okay who is going to take this ‘level 6?"' (p.261). Similarly, we have 
identified in our own research that children are sometimes referred to as ‘the special 
needs’ as, for example in "we’re taking the special needs to the supermarket 
tomorrow" (Runswick-Cole and Hodge 2009: 3). When this happens it is not just a 
description of a category of children.  Rather, the language used here constructs ‘the 
special needs’ and defines the limits for what disabled children are allowed to be: they 
become non-children, different from and, implicitly, lesser than other (normal) 
children. In becoming 'the special needs' these children are therefore denied their 
humanity.   Where these discourses dominate, they also proliferate and are adopted by 
other members of the school community. So, for example, we have heard one pupil 
say to another: '"is your brother a special need?"' (Runswick-Cole and Hodge, 2009: 
3).   
 
Crucially for our analysis of parent-practitioner talk, discourse analysis suggests that 
the meanings of language change constantly, rather than having one meaning and 
being fixed (Burman and Parker, 1993).  We accept that the interpretations that we 
offer below are highly contested and that different accounts and analyses of the talk 
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by readers with different epistemic positions arising from different biographical 
standpoints could be offered.  However, the purpose of drawing from discourse 
analysis here is that it allows us to reflect on what people say and what this might 
reveal of the meanings within the detail of the talk and the nature of the wider society 
in which we live.  
 
Illustrating the Problem 
The following examples that we use to illustrate some of the problems within 
practitioner-parent talk come from our own experience or have been reported to us by 
participants within the different research projects that we have been involved with. A 
number of these examples we have heard in similar form from many different parents 
over the years. We are particularly interested in examples of talk where the 
practitioner was giving a message to a parent and in how that message was 
understood. An example of this from Katherine’s own experience occurred when a 
social worker said "I’m sorry I’ve not got back to you I’ve been really busy". 
Katherine, as a parent, heard this as: "Other families are more important than ours".   
We have shared our analysis of these encounters at conferences with practitioners and 
parents. Conference delegates tell us that they recognise many of these examples from 
their own experiences. The practitioners who have made such statements to parents 
themselves have revealed that they had not anticipated that the comments might be 
received so differently from how they were intended. Although once reflected upon 
the potential for different understandings becomes apparent. The examples are 
presented below. We first report something that a practitioner has said to a parent and 
then we describe how that parent told us they had interpreted the statement. 
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You say … I hear …. 
You say… 
 
I hear … 
Head teacher: have you thought about 
going back to work? 
 
Parent: she thinks I’m an over anxious 
mother with too much time on my hands. 
 
Teaching Assistant:  she was really tired 
when she came in this morning. 
Parent: we never go out because of her 
difficulties with fatigue, we never do the 
things other families do, and just for 
once, when we do, you have a go at me! 
You’re telling me off. 
 
Doctor: what’s your job? Parent: what does it matter what my job 
is?  You are judging me 
 
Occupational therapist:  I didn’t tell you 
about DLA (Disability Living Allowance: 
A welfare benefit for disabled children 
and adults) because I knew your partner 
had a good job. 
 
Parent: You shouldn’t be claiming 
benefits. 
 
Teacher: He has said he doesn’t want to 
go to work experience. You can over rule 
Parent: Adult services won't look after 
my child properly. 
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him at home, but I can’t, he’s seventeen. 
 
 
Teacher: his teaching assistant reads 
with him, I have 29 other children in the 
class to think about. 
 
Parent: the teacher doesn't see my child 
as her responsibility. 
Inclusion Officer: you are not entitled to 
a Rolls Royce service. We have limited 
resources that we must allocate fairly. 
 
Parent: you are a greedy, pushy, selfish 
parent. 
 
Teacher: I know he’s lashing out but that 
is what children with autism and epilepsy 
do. 
 
Parent: You don't see my son, you don't 
recognise him as an individual. 
 
Speech and Language Therapist: your 
daughter is making really good progress. 
Parent: hey?  She’s still really struggling 
- oh no, they are about to discharge her! 
 
Speech and Language Therapist:  I’m 
sorry but your child doesn’t meet the 
criteria for our service.  There are some 
spaces on the anger management classes 
for parents. 
Parent: You think I have a problem with 
anger and I can’t parent my child. 
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Receptionist at LA offices: [hand over 
phone so slightly muffled] it’s Mrs Smith 
on the phone, are you in? 
Parent: the whole office thinks I’m a 
problem. 
 
Bridging the (epistemic) gap 
The accounts above reveal the gaps between parents and practitioners in their 
everyday talk.  They are uncomfortable, but they are, perhaps, familiar extracts.  We 
suspect that readers may have their own examples of when these sticky moments have 
emerged in their talk with parents and/or practitioners. 
What we are interested in here is: how far it is possible to bridge these gaps in 
understanding between parents and practitioners?  A discussion like this is one 
starting point. The recognition of a fracture in parent-practitioner partnerships and a 
desire to understand how and why this might occur opens up the possibility of 
developing new understandings.   Ashworth (2016) notes that within phenomenology 
it is argued that people can achieve a 'reciprocity of perspectives' (p. 26). This occurs 
when one party in a communication adopts the mental perspective of another. Husserl 
(1931) identifies empathy as one route to doing so but neither Husserl nor Ashworth 
detail how exactly this might be achieved across significantly different lifeworlds.  To 
offer one possible explanation for how this might occur we have drawn on the work 
of two philosophers MacKenzie and Scully (2007).  MacKenzie and Scully (2007) 
have explored what they describe as the epistemic gap between non-disabled people 
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and disabled people in relation to quality of life issues.  We use their ideas to explore 




How would you feel? 
A simple, common sense response to all of the encounters above is to say that parents 
and professionals should ask themselves how they would feel if someone said that to 
them.  So, for example, in the last of the examples above we could ask the 
practitioner: "how would you feel if you rang up to ask for information and overheard 
someone checking whether the person who is supposed to help you wanted to or not?" 
Just simply imagine that you were in the parent’s place. If you wouldn’t like it then, 
chances are, they wouldn’t either.  Implicit in this advice is that it is easy to imagine 
how another person might be feeling, simply do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you (MacKenzie and Scully, 2007).  
In this example, imagining how you would feel if you made the phone call seems 
straightforward and good advice, but it does not perhaps capture the full complexity 
of the encounter.  You did not make the phone call, a(nother) parent of a child with 
SEND did. To understand this phone call more fully, there needs to be what 
MacKenzie and Scully call (2007: 339) ‘perspective shifting'. In other words, simply 
projecting your own experiences may not be enough for you to understand the 
parent’s feelings about the phone call.  
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What is needed is for you to make ‘imaginative adjustments’ (MacKenzie and Scully, 
2007: 339) in order to understand the encounter, not as if it happened to you, but from 
the perspective of the parent caller; a failure to do this may mean that we simply put 
ourselves in the place of an other, rather than responding to the other’s experience. 
It could be suggested that what is needed is something more like what Peter Goldie 
(cited in MacKenzie and Scully, 2007: 341) calls 'in-your-shoes-imagining'. This 
requires us to imagine, not that the event is happening to us, but to someone else; we 
have to imagine that we are that person - as if we were that parent caller.  But this, it 
turns out, is no simple task. As MacKenzie and Scully (2007) point out, our ability to 
do this depends on two factors: first, the pool of our own experiences we have to draw 
on.  Our own experiences of making phone calls or asking for information will 
influence how we understand the parent's experiences.  If we have never made a 
phone call asking for help or for information on behalf of a child then this will be 
more difficult to imagine. Secondly, it will also depend on what we already know 
about that particular parent.  From the account, we know very little, but we can 
imagine that she has phoned before, that she is known in the office and that she is 
someone that people find difficult to talk to and that the people in the office have 
stopped caring whether or not she knows this (though we do not know the reasons 
why). 
Let us take another example from the encounters above: "she was really tired when 
she came in this morning".  At face value, this is a simple statement of fact.  We do 
not know if the TA in this story is a parent her (him) self who has struggled to get her 
own child to bed at night or to get her up in the morning. The TA may feel that she is 
duty bound to tell the parent every aspect of the child's school experience good or 
bad. The TA may not intend that the parent act on the information only that she has it. 
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We do not know from this conversation how well the TA knows the child and if she 
understands what the parent describes as ‘fatigue issues’ and the TA probably does 
not know that this was the first night out the family had been on for ages.  It seems 
that the TA is not engaging in 'in-your-shoes-imagining'.  But as we have already 
noted, depending on your own knowledge and experiences this is a difficult thing to 
do.   
In her doctoral study, Broomhead (2013) looked at the judgment teachers and 
teaching assistants made about whether children could control their behaviour and she 
asked how these judgments were influenced by the label or diagnosis a child had been 
given.  She found that children labeled with Behavioural, Emotional and Social 
Difficulties (BESD) were more likely to be thought able to control their behaviour 
than children labeled with autism, for example, who, because of people's 
understandings of autism, were thought to be unable to control their behaviour. As 
part of the study, one of the parents of a child with the label of BESD worked with 
trainee teachers to describe her life as the mother of a child with BESD. She talked 
about what life was like outside of school for her and her child.  Following the 
session, one of the student teachers remarked that she had never really thought about 
what happened to children before or after school.  This lack of 'in-your-shoes-
imagining' is a striking example of the epistemic gap between parents and 
practitioners and between practitioners and pupils.  And yet, as MacKenzie and Scully 
(2007) suggest, the dangers of 'in–your-shoes imagining', in this situation, is it that we 
simply project our own experiences and prejudices onto the situation: "if I had a child 
with fatigue, I’d get a baby sitter, if I wanted to go out late…". So something more is 
required than 'in-your-shoes imagining' if reciprocity of perspective is to be achieved. 
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Mackenzie and Scully (2007) suggest that this might be Sympathetic Moral 
Imagination. 
 
Sympathetic Moral Imagination 
In sympathetic moral imagination one does not try to imagine being the 
other from the inside. Rather, one recognises that the other is different 
from oneself, one imaginatively engages with her perceptions and 
experiences, as she represents them, and one responds emotionally to her 
perspective and her situation. (MacKenzie and Scully, 2007: 347). 
 
Sympathetic moral imagination involves recognising that a person is different from 
ourselves but trying to identify how an event is experienced by that actual person 
rather than how we think we would experience it if it happened to us. Let us return to 
another example from the parent-practitioner talk to explore how this might work: 
 
Teacher: I know he’s lashing out but that 
is what children with autism and epilepsy 
do. 
Parent: You don't see my son, you don't 
recognise him as an individual 
 
 
Here the epistemic gap is clearly visible.  The practitioner is drawing on his (her) 
‘expert’ knowledge of children with ‘autism and epilepsy’ to inform a parent that the 
child’s behaviour is ‘normal’ for a child with that label.  In stark contrast, the parent is 
invoking her (his) own knowledge of the child as an individual with fears and 
frustrations that can be triggered by external stimuli and to which the child sometimes 
lashes out. The parent may have experienced many times previously her child's 
behaviour just being explained away by practitioners as "just what children with 
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autism and epilepsy do" without anyone really giving thought to whether there are 
other reasons why the child might feel the need to resort to lashing out. The claim that 
‘lashing out’ is what children with autism and epilepsy ‘do’ seems yet another attempt 
to close down the conversation.  It demonstrates a reluctance to engage with the 
parent’s concerns, thoughts and experience at an emotional level.  It fails to recognise 
the long shared history of the parent and child in negotiating the behaviour with the 
child and with other practitioners.  The appeal by the teacher to the labeling discourse 
is an attempt to ‘fix’ the meaning of the child’s behaviour and firmly to locate the 
difficulty within the child.  This kind of discursive positioning is difficult for a parent 
to resist.  Their knowledge of their child as an individual is made irrelevant; any 
challenge might seem to deny the teacher his/her expert knowledge and status. What 
might a response from a practitioner look like that involved 'sympathetic moral 
imagination'?  An approach that draws on sympathetic moral imagination would 
encourage the practitioner to open up the conversation, to ask about what the 
behaviour means for the parent, the issues that arise for the parent because of it and 
how the shared history of parent and child might inform the development of a support 
strategy. Yet the opportunity for either parent or practitioner to engage in such 
conversations at the school gates at the end of the day or in a multi-professional 
meeting seem limited. Applying sympathetic moral imagination is essential but the 
sharing of experience requires protected time and space. 
 
We have argued therefore that the notion of biographical standpoint suggests that the 
practitioners may not always have the intuitive capability to understand what it means 
to be a parent of a disabled child. However, we would not want to position the 
responsibility for ruptures in communication entirely with individual practitioners: 
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they do not operate within a vacuum and are part of a system that dictates many of 
their practices and which promotes a particular view of disability. Individual 
practitioner responses are situated therefore within wider systemic barriers that often 





Habermas, a sociologist and philosopher, argues that the system makes objects of the 
people that it serves rather than valuing them as partners working together to achieve 
the goals of its members (Burns and Früchtel 2014). In doing so the system substitutes 
the equality of shared, reciprocal and negotiated support between people within the 
lifeworld with the structured, contracted and paid service delivered by the 
system.  Lifeworld is used here in the sense of the everyday lives of people where 
caring about and for each other takes place within informal social networks. Within 
this process empathy becomes a tool of instrumental rationality (Weber 1964 cited 
Burns and Früchtel 2014) in the sense that it is reduced to a method that enables the 
practitioner to solve the problem of the parent and restore order to the system. 
Practitioner empathy as controlled by the system is different to the empathy of the 
lifeworld. In the lifeworld empathy arises usually out of an informed and detailed 
understanding of what it means to be the other person and how she (he) feels about 
what is happening in her life. This understanding might arise from a long-standing 
relationship with the other person and/or through sharing a similar life context and 
experiences.  Practitioner empathy however is more distanced, measured and 
controlled without the genuine felt emotional connection that can arise from a shared 
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history of experience. Empathy is utilised to achieve the goals of the organisation 
rather than to recognise and appreciate the effect of the system on families. 
This is not to suggest that practitioners are emotionally cold, cynical manipulators of 
parents of disabled children. Of course we know that the majority of child educators 
and practitioners in related services are deeply committed to enabling and supporting 
the lives of disabled children and their families. But we are all subject to the insidious 
workings of the system that often without us recognising it; the system shapes how 
we respond within the customs and practices of the workplace. Lipsky (1971) 
proposed the notion of 'street-level bureaucracy' to make explicit some of these 
embedded cultural work practices that inhibit practitioners from effectively bridging 
epistemic chasm between staff and 'clients'. Lipsky's ideas, although conceived over 
30 years ago, are still utilised by social science researchers (Ellis 2007, 2011) and are 
a helpful support here when theorising why epistemic chasms might erupt between 
practitioners and clients. 
Lipsky argues that practitioners experience stress as a result of being the front line 
representatives of a system that will never provide for all the requirements of those 
compelled to use its services. The pressure of time constraints, the requirement to 
distribute extremely limited resources and the pressure to meet performance targets 
produce defensive reactions in practitioners. These include desisting from fully 
appreciating clients as people and being on constant guard against negative reactions 
from clients. Lipsky proposes that one mode of reaction to these stresses is to adopt 
'simplifications' (p. 395). An example of a simplification might be to think of parents 
who accept instruction or advice without question as 'good parents' and those who 
challenge practitioners as 'difficult parents'.  Both categories of course act to de-
personalise the parent and prevent practitioners from coming to fully developed 
 23 
understandings of the parents as people.  Lipsky also identifies defense mechanisms 
that practitioners resort to in order to manage these stresses. One of these is to 
conceptualise certain groups as being outside of their remit of care. So disabled 
children and their parents may be thought of as 'special'; different; more suited to 
medical or psychological intervention than to education and so therefore really 
beyond the skills and responsibility of the education practitioner. Lumby (2007) 
argues that within the school system the voice of parents 'is not given epistemic 
equality with that of staff' (p.222). Using the Lipsky model this could also be 
conceived of as a defense mechanism: the dismissal of parental concerns over 
provision and practices as misinformed or the unfounded worries of overprotective 
parents excuse educators from critically examining their own practices and the work 
of the school can then continue untroubled. 
For Lipsky what is critical is that these issues are brought into the light and reflected 
upon so that practitioners come to recognise these as views that they hold and accept 
that they too are part of the problem. This can lead to the realisation that breakdowns 
in communication are not just the result of special or difficult parents or an under 
resourced system but also because of how practitioners are choosing to engage with 
their clients. Lipsky suggests that clients are likely to have greater confidence and 
trust in those practitioners to whom they can best relate to, those who most seem to 
understand and appreciate their experience. These may not always be the most highly 
qualified or most experienced staff and so schools and related services need therefore 
to be alert to where successful relationships are developing between their staff and 





In this paper we have argued that practitioner-parent talk often works against the 
forming of positive partnerships. We have illustrated this through the provision of 
examples from the experiences of parents to highlight the damage that talk can do. 
Sometimes this occurs through miscommunication when one party hears a message 
that the other did not intend. However often parents accurately 'hear between the 
words' of practitioner talk messages of criticism and rejection.  We argue here that 
these destructive communications often arise from the gaps between the epistemic 
positions of practitioners and parents that result from their different biographical 
standpoints. They arise because practitioners have not appreciated what it means and 
feels like to be that parent at that time in that situation.  We have identified some of 
the structural barriers that prevent the street-level bureaucrat from having the time, 
space, confidence and permission to try and bridge these epistemic gaps. But many 
practitioners are committed, skilled and resourceful and once alerted to the problem 
will find ways to address it. We have suggested here that one way of bridging these 
gaps is through the employment of sympathetic moral imagination. If practitioners 
were better able to understand the emotional and physical impact of their talk on 
parents then they are likely to be more careful with the messages they convey. 
However, MacKenzie and Scully (2007) acknowledge that being able to imagine the 
experience of another is a challenging task. Clearly this is difficult enough between 
practitioners and parents but the Code of Practice also requires local authorities and 
other agencies to engage directly with young people. Epistemic gaps exist within all 
communications and the further apart the biographical standpoints the wider the 
chasms are likely to be. Accessing the lived experience of disabled children and 
young people and understanding the impacts of this on their being will challenge even 
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the most empathetic of non-disabled practitioners.  Sympathetic moral imagination is 
a skill that all practitioners need to develop if they are to bridge the epistemic divides 
between themselves and those whom they support.      
 
 Sympathetic moral imagination relies upon a focused attendance to how a parent (or 
child, young person)  is representing that experience: 
In sympathetic moral imagination one does not try to imagine being the 
other from the inside. Rather, one recognises that the other is different 
from oneself, one imaginatively engages with her perceptions and 
experiences, as she represents them, and one responds emotionally to her 
perspective and her situation (p.347).  
 
Practitioners may often feel that they do not have the ability, the time or sufficient 
contact with a parent to be able to develop this degree of intimacy with a parent's 
particular situation. Nor would we want parents to be expected to reveal to 
practitioners all aspects of their lives. So the question remains as to how practitioners 
might develop sympathetic moral imagination. Turning again to MacKenzie and 
Scully (2007: 347) they suggest how this might be enabled: 
There are a variety of ways in which moral imagination can be cultivated 
and stimulated, including talking to those whose perspectives one is 
trying to understand, informing oneself about their situation, reading 
fictional representations of their lives, watching films that represent the 
world from their point of view, and so on.  
  
Acknowledging and talking through these issues with colleagues is, perhaps, one way 
to develop sympathetic moral imagination. More critical is hearing representations 
from parents themselves. Many parent and carer groups provide information and 
training sessions for practitioners about a range of experiences related to being the 
parent or carer of a disabled child: These should become a critical part of any 
practitioner development programme.  Learning generically about experiences of 
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parents may not always enable practitioners to know exactly how life might be for a 
particular parent but it will make practitioners more aware of the epistemic gaps. And 
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